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Julian R. Betts
wo of the most important reforms to American
public schooling in this century have been an
increase in the minimum school-leaving age
and a dramatic increase in expenditures per
pupil. The former reform has generally been hailed as a
success, given evidence that an extra year of schooling
significantly boosts students’ earnings later in life. How-
ever, evidence on the effectiveness of the trend toward
higher spending per pupil, smaller class sizes, and more
highly educated and trained teachers is much more
mixed. A host of studies on the link between school
finances and test scores has not shown a systematic link
between spending and achievement. Another set of stud-
ies tests whether higher school spending leads to higher
earnings for students later in life. The findings in this
body of work are also mixed: even the most optimistic
results suggest a very low rate of return to increased
school expenditures.
Given the central role of public schools in pre-
paring younger generations for the workforce and the
sizable expenditures devoted to public schools, it
becomes important to ask whether other reforms might
increase the effectiveness of public schooling. The
premise of this paper is that educational standards are a
key element in school reform. The paper suggests that
the twin policies of higher school-leaving ages and
higher spending would have been much more effective if
accompanied by systematic increases in educational
standards. In a sense, these two policies form a two-
legged stool. Increasing the number of years that students
must spend in school and increasing spending per
pupil—without at the same time stipulating what sub-
ject matter students should have mastered by each age—
are unlikely to maximize the rate at which students
learn. The missing “leg” in these past reforms is a set of
academic standards against which both students and
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Chart 1
Trends in Real Spending per Pupil 
and in the Pupil-Teacher Ratio
Source:  National Center for Education Statistics (1991).























schools are measured. Instead of allowing students to
drop out of school merely because they have reached the
age of sixteen, why not require students who wish to
leave school before graduation to pass a set of minimum
competency tests? Similarly, does it make sense to
increase funding for public schools without at the same
time requiring the schools to document that they have
translated these additional expenditures into improved
student achievement? In both cases, the need for a clear
set of curriculum standards, backed by testing, is clear.
The central point is simple: far and away the
most important determinant of how quickly students
learn is the effort of students themselves. It follows that
an increase in schools’ expectations of students could
have important effects on the quality of public school-
ing. By establishing a rigorous set of educational stan-
dards, schools can create a set of incentives and rewards
to promote student learning. Higher standards can
increase the effectiveness of school-leaving policies.
Instead of simply allowing students to drop out at age
sixteen, schools might require an exit exam. In this way,
a minimal level of academic achievement, rather than
age alone, would become the prerequisite for dropping
out of school. Similarly, reductions in class size might
become more effective if, at the same time, schools
increased the standards that students at each grade level
are expected to meet.
The next section briefly outlines the history of
past reforms related to the minimum school-leaving age
and spending per pupil. The subsequent section outlines
ways in which schools can heighten their expectations of
students. In practice, “higher expectations” can come in
the form of additional homework, the development of
curriculum standards in conjunction with an assessment
of students’ progress in mastering the curriculum, stricter
grade-promotion policies, and more stringent grading of
students. Later sections then analyze whether such poli-
cies to promote higher educational standards work in
practice. The penultimate section delves into practical
and political issues that can afflict a school administra-
tion when it tries to increase standards, and suggests
solutions to some of these problems.
A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF PAST 
INCREASES IN THE SCHOOL-LEAVING 
AGE AND IN SPENDING PER PUPIL
Between 1960 and 1990, real spending per pupil and
the teacher-pupil ratio increased dramatically (Chart 1).
(Expenditures per pupil are expressed in 1990-91 prices,
and so account for inflation.) Betts (1995a), among
others, documents that there has been a strong trend
toward increased spending per pupil throughout the
century in the United States. This trend represents one
of the most important changes in the recent history of
public schooling.
A second important reform in American public
schooling has been increases in the school-leaving age.
Lang and Kropp (1986) document that over time the
number of states without a school-leaving age has
dropped, and the average school-leaving age has risen
considerably (Chart 2). Most of the changes in the school-
leaving age occurred in the first half of the century.
(However, Lang and Kropp note that by 1965 two
states—Mississippi and South Carolina—had abolished
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Chart 2
Distribution of Minimum School-Leaving Ages 
across States, by Year
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What benefits, then, have resulted from these two
important transformations in American public schooling?
Consider first the impact of additional school spending.
For over three decades, social scientists have examined the
link between school expenditures and student success.
Most of this effort has modeled test scores as a function of
spending per pupil, the teacher-pupil ratio, and other
measures of school inputs. Since other contributors to this
conference volume address this literature, I will not review
it in detail here. It suffices to mention that in a recent
review, Hanushek (1996) found that of 163 estimates of
how spending per pupil affects student performance, only
27 percent found a positive and significant relationship.
Similarly, of 277 reported estimates of the impact of the
teacher-pupil ratio on student performance, only 15 percent
found a positive and significant link, while 13 percent
reported a negative and significant link. These figures do
not mean that money never matters. Instead, they suggest
that the relationship, if positive, is a rather tenuous one.
In American schools, at least as they have operated in the
past, spending has not had large or systematic effects on
student achievement. 
The conclusion drawn from the statistical research
is supported by aggregate trends in school spending and in
student achievement. Chart 1 shows trends in current
expenditures per pupil and the pupil-teacher ratio in
American public schools between 1960 and 1990. By both
measures, the financial resources spent on public school
students have risen markedly over the last three decades.
Yet during the same period, student achievement has
hardly changed, and by one measure it may even have
fallen. Test scores on the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress, a test given to a random sample of students
in various grades since the early 1970s, have changed little
over the 1970s and 1980s. Trends in the Scholastic Aptitude
Test show a sharp decline in the late 1960s, a more gradual
decline during the 1970s, and a partial recovery since then
(see, for instance, Hanushek [1996]). 
From an economist’s perspective, the underlying
goal of education is to prepare younger generations for suc-
cess in adult life. A major determinant of adult success is
earnings. Betts (1996a) surveys the literature that asks
whether school spending affects students’ earnings later in
life, even if there appears to be little relationship between
school resources and test scores. Quite a number of studies
have found a relationship between adult males’ earnings
and school resources in their state of birth. But the litera-
ture is by no means unanimous. Work by Betts (1995a)
and Grogger (1996), among others, shows that when
school resources are measured at the school actually
attended, the results are much more consistent with the
test score literature: the impact of school inputs on earn-
ings is not statistically significant.
More to the point, the estimated effect of raising
school spending on students’ subsequent earnings is
extremely small. This is true whether one measures school
resources at the school actually attended or the district
attended, or whether one instead uses the person’s state of
birth to create a rough proxy for school resources.
The small impact of school spending on earn-
ings stands in stark contrast to a voluminous literature
documenting that a person’s years of schooling are
strongly related to subsequent earnings. Mincer’s (1974)
seminal contribution estimates that one additional year100 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
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of schooling typically increases wages by about 7 to
10 percent. Psacharopolous (1985), in a review of the
literature, estimates that in developed countries a year
of schooling typically is associated with a 9 percent rise
in earnings. He also reports much higher returns to
years of schooling in developing countries—a finding
that invites us to ask what might be done in developed
countries, such as the United States, to increase the
payoff to a year of schooling.
Simple calculations suggest that the economic
returns to raising the school-leaving age are fairly sub-
stantial, but that the economic returns to increasing
school spending are relatively meager. Consider first the
rate of return to increasing spending per pupil or
increasing the teacher-pupil ratio. It is important to dis-
count future costs and benefits when calculating the net
benefits from spending on a given school input, because
all the costs are incurred in the early years of a person’s
life, while the benefits of higher wages accrue much
later. The following calculations discount all costs and
benefits to the year in which a student is in kindergar-
ten. I assume that a 1 percent increase in spending per
student is made in every school year between kindergar-
ten and grade 12. To calculate the resulting increase in
the discounted value of lifetime earnings, I multiply the
predicted percentage wage gain, taken from the elastici-
ties reported in Betts (1996a), by the discounted value of
earnings for the average American male worker between
the ages of nineteen and sixty-four. The calculation of
the present discounted value of earnings uses the actual
profile of earnings by age for male American workers,
obtained using weighted earnings data from the March
1993 Current Population Survey tape. This tape contains
information on annual earnings in 1992. The average
annual earnings of male workers obtained from the
Current Population Survey, taken as a simple mean
across all ages from nineteen to sixty-four, was $22,737.1
Using this information, it is possible to calculate the net
percentage return to an investment in school spending.
This is calculated as the net return (wage gains minus
the costs), divided by the costs, and expressed in percent-
age terms. 
Similarly, one can calculate the net percentage
return to an extra year spent in high school. Following
Betts (1996a), assume conservatively that if we required
a student who had dropped out of high school after
grade 11 to remain in school for another year, the addi-
tional human capital he acquired would increase his
earnings by 7.5 percent. This must be balanced against
the cost of an extra year of schooling, which is wages
forgone plus average spending per pupil in public
schools, the latter of which is approximately $5,000.2
By calculating the estimated percentage wage gains and
the initial wages lost from staying in school, again using
the March 1993 survey, we can obtain different net
returns on the initial investment for different “interest
rates” or “discount rates.”
The net percentage return to different types of
educational expenditures is plotted in Chart 3. Note that as
the discount rate rises, the net percentage return in general
falls, because the given educational expenditure leads to
higher predicted earnings for the student, but only later in
life. As the discount rate rises, the present value of these
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The results are remarkable. The net percentage
returns to requiring an extra year of high school are much
higher than the returns to increasing school spending or to
increasing the teacher-pupil ratio. As previously men-
tioned, when researchers have measured the actual school
resources in a person’s school district or school, the esti-
mated effect of school spending is found to be smaller than
when researchers instead use spending in the person’s state
of birth as a proxy. But even the most optimistic results—
those that use the state-level data—suggest far smaller
returns to increased spending per pupil or teacher-pupil
ratios than are obtained when the student stays in school an
extra year. Furthermore, in the district-level or school-level
studies of the teacher-pupil ratio, even at a discount rate of
0 percent the initial costs of hiring more teachers are never
recouped by subsequent increases in students’ wages.
What is to explain the huge discrepancy between
the returns to staying in school an extra year and the returns
to increasing spending per pupil or increased teacher-pupil
ratios? One possibility is that the returns to a year of educa-
tion do not reflect true productivity gains. Instead, these
returns might arise because of unobserved differences in abil-
ity between the highly educated and the less well educated.
In other words, talented students might obtain more educa-
tion merely to signal their ability to employers. If this
“signaling” theory is true, then the observed returns to
increasing the school-leaving age would be largely illusory.
Yet compiling evidence in favor of the idea that
education merely signals a worker’s productivity, rather
than adding to productivity, has proved quite difficult.
Lang and Kropp (1986) indirectly test for signaling. When
a state raises its school-leaving age to, say, sixteen, then if
students obtain education in order to signal their ability to
employers, some seventeen- and eighteen-year-old students
who would formerly have dropped out at age sixteen now
begin to stay in school longer. They do this to “separate”
themselves from their less able classmates. Lang and Kropp
present some evidence that this has occurred historically.
But numerous studies that have attempted to control for
unobserved ability more directly have typically found that
a year of schooling truly does increase productivity (see, for
instance, Willis and Rosen [1979]). Numerous studies of
twins have attempted to sort out the true impact of a year
of schooling on an individual’s wage by comparing twins
who obtained different levels of education. These studies
have typically found that, if anything, the true produc-
tivity gain that results from an extra year of school is even
higher than the 7.5 percent return that I used in the above
analysis (see, for instance, Ashenfelter and Krueger
[1994]). If these estimates are accurate, they suggest that
increasing the school-leaving age would have substantial
effects on the earnings of the affected students.
The best summary of the existing evidence is that, in
the United States, the returns to increased spending per pupil
or to increased teacher-pupil ratios have been extremely mod-
est. The returns to an extra year of high school are much
higher. However, as shown in Chart 3, even in this case the
returns are not astronomically high: above a discount rate of
10.95 percent, the returns to additional education become
negative. So, educational expenditures along the “extensive”
margin (years of schooling) have been fairly productive, while
expenditures along the “intensive” margin (spending per
pupil) have had surprisingly small payoffs. This raises the
question whether other aspects of public schools need to be
changed in order to make financial inputs more effective than
they have been in the past. The rest of this paper examines the
proposition that the missing element in past reforms—the
third leg of the stool—has been higher standards, higher
expectations, and a higher degree of accountability in the
nation’s public schools.
A DEFINITION OF ACADEMIC STANDARDS 
AND ACADEMIC EXPECTATIONS, 
WITH EXAMPLES
It is easy to speak in general terms about higher standards
and higher academic expectations for the nation’s students.
But what in practice does this mean? This section briefly
outlines the necessary components for a variety of reforms
that could represent a genuine shift toward higher standards.
CURRICULUM STANDARDS, TESTS OF ACHIEVEMENT, 
AND ACTIVE RESPONSES TO FAILURE 
Perhaps the most often discussed way of increasing
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subjects such as mathematics, science, and English. As
explained in the next section, many states have embarked
on curriculum reform in one or more subjects. For curricu-
lum reform to succeed, the subject content must be speci-
fied in detail, to ensure that all schools interpret the
standard in the same way. A curriculum that states that “by
grade 4, students will be able to express themselves well in
written English” would not meet this criterion. It is so
vague that it gives teachers little if any direction about
what to teach. A far better approach would be to specify
basic rules of grammar, spelling, and composition that
should be mastered by that grade. The point of such a stan-
dard is not to tell teachers how to teach but to guide them
as to what to teach, and when.
Creating a specific list of skills and knowledge
that children should acquire in each grade is the first
step. A curriculum standard by itself, however, is
unlikely to improve schools substantially. It is also neces-
sary to test students periodically to check whether they
are meeting the standards set for each grade. Some states
now have mandatory achievement tests in certain grades,
but other states allow school districts to decide for them-
selves whether they want to test children. If so, the
districts must choose among off-the-shelf tests or write a
new test specific to their own curriculum. The need for a
very specifically worded curriculum now becomes even
more obvious: without a detailed curriculum, it will
prove impossible to devise a test that gauges students’
academic progress.
The twin pillars of content standards, then, are a
specifically worded curriculum and achievement tests
that measure how well students are absorbing the pre-
scribed curriculum.
It is certainly possible that testing based on con-
tent standards could improve the quality of schooling
directly. Once parents become aware of any subject areas in
which their children have fallen behind, they are likely to
become more actively involved in their children’s school-
ing. Students themselves are likely to exert more effort
during the academic year, knowing that at the end of the
school year they will take a test that will inform their
teachers and their parents about how much they have
learned. But there remains a distinct possibility that some
students and some school administrations would disregard
test results.
The investment in content standards and testing
is likely to have a bigger payoff if there is something tan-
gible at stake for both students and schools. The central
question becomes, how, if at all, should a school react if a
student does poorly on an achievement test? One obvious
solution is for the school to devote additional resources—
for example, tutoring or smaller classes—to such students.
In other words, once a school system has developed a
detailed curriculum and begins to test its students, it can
direct additional spending to the students who need the
most help. Systematic testing makes it possible to move
away from a policy of improving schools through expen-
sive systemwide increases in spending. This more focused
approach to spending might make additional spending on
schools much more effective than it has been in the past. To
some extent, schools already direct more resources toward
students whose achievement lags their grade level (see,
for instance, Betts and Shkolnik [forthcoming]). How-
ever, the institution of a specific curriculum and regular
testing based on this curriculum would allow more
effective targeting of additional school expenditures toward
children of relatively low achievement.
A second way in which schools can react when a
student performs poorly on a test is to give the student a
direct stake in his or her academic progress. A very long
tradition in American schools has been to hold students
back a year if they have not progressed sufficiently.
Another approach is to require students who are lagging
behind to attend summer school. Students will clearly
want to avoid either of these outcomes, and thus will be
motivated to work hard during the school year. The next
section will discuss an innovative program recently imple-
mented in Chicago that seeks to hold students accountable
for their progress, yet gives failing students a second
chance to exhibit their academic prowess.
The idea that testing would be more effective if
something tangible were at stake is equally applicable to
students and to their teachers and schools. Later on, I will
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already are using—students’ test scores to identify schools
that are failing, and some of the ways in which school
administrations are intervening in such cases.
GRADUATION EXAMS AND EXIT EXAMS
FOR SCHOOL LEAVERS
The above section argues in favor of regular monitoring of
students as they progress through school. A closely related
idea is to test students in grade 12 to ensure that they will
graduate from high school with a skill level commensurate
with the demands of the labor market. As noted in the next
section, some states are moving in this direction and one—
New York—has had a system similar to this one in place
since the last century.
A less widely practiced policy is to provide a test
of achievement that all students must pass before being
allowed to graduate from high school or to drop out of high
school. Such a test would ideally be offered to students in
grade 9 or 10 and would focus on basic skills: reading,
writing, and mathematics. In most states, such a policy
would represent a sea change in how those likely to drop
out of school are treated. In many states, students are
allowed to drop out of school when they reach the age of
sixteen, without having to demonstrate command of even
the most basic skills. In today’s economy—in which new
technologies and changes in international trade patterns
have acted to shift employers’ needs toward more highly
skilled labor—student dropouts have fared particularly
badly over the last two decades. During the 1980s, the real
wages of those with a college degree held fairly steady,
while the real wages of those with a high school diploma or
less fell substantially. For instance, Blackburn, Bloom, and
Freeman (1990) report that between 1973 and 1987 the
earnings of white male high school dropouts who worked
full time and full year and were twenty-five to thirty-four
years old fell from $20,128 to just $15,922. (Both of these
figures are expressed in 1987 prices.) Such a precipitous fall
in earnings over this short period suggests that schools
should be particularly concerned about how well they are
preparing their weakest students for the modern labor
market. Since so many of these students ultimately drop
out of high school, it stands to reason that the criterion for
dropping out should not simply be age, but should instead
be a minimal level of achievement on a test of basic skills.
Another advantage of such a policy shift is that it
gets the incentives right for students. A high school
teacher will have little impact on a disaffected fifteen-
year-old student who can feel free to ignore class assign-
ments and so on, knowing that he or she can drop out at
will after turning sixteen. By supplementing or replacing
the policy of a minimum school-leaving age with a mini-
mum school-leaving level of achievement, schools will give
such students the right incentives to make the most of
the time they do spend in school. Students will realize
that if they cannot demonstrate mastery of a core set of
skills—such as reading, writing, and basic mathematics—
they will have to remain in school until they are able to
do so. Of course, accommodation will be required for stu-
dents with learning disabilities.
HIGHER GRADING STANDARDS
Another component of a school’s overall standards is the
way in which its teachers assign letter grades. If a school
makes it overly easy to obtain a grade of A, the school is
likely to reduce many students’ effort. The best students,
having obtained the top grade with little effort, will not
find it worthwhile to work harder, because when they
apply for a job or for admission to a university, their tran-
scripts will not convey to potential employers this addi-
tional effort. For those who are not already A students,
weaker grading standards can also be counterproductive in
the sense that if any of these students think that a potential
employer will care about letter grades, they can receive
adequate letter grades without exerting much effort. Simi-
larly, if B or C students hold any hope of attending a
university, then letter grades should be of direct concern
to them, so higher grading standards should induce
additional effort.
HOMEWORK
The above suggestions deal with specific examples of how a
school can set higher standards. Another step that a school
could take is to set higher expectations of its students. A
primary example of this is a school that encourages teachers104 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
to assign more homework to students, especially in core
subjects such as English and math. The next section pro-
vides a summary of a growing body of evidence supporting
homework as a key to creating better schools.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIGHER 
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS IN PRACTICE
CURRICULUM STANDARDS AND TESTS OF 
ACHIEVEMENT: ARE THEY WIDELY USED? 
DO THEY WORK?
One of the main proponents of curriculum standards and
achievement testing has been John Bishop. In a series of
papers, Bishop (1996, 1997) has gathered indirect evidence
that such standards can palpably improve the quality of
education. For instance, he reports that students from the
state of New York tend to outperform students from other
states on standardized tests such as the Scholastic Aptitude
Test (now known as the SAT). While there are literally
dozens of potential explanations for such a finding, one is
that New York has stood alone in setting a statewide exam
for high school seniors: students in New York have long
had the option of taking the Regents examinations. Those
who pass the exams receive a high school diploma different
from that received by students who opt not to take the
Regents exams. Passing the exams has in general been a
prerequisite for college entry in New York.
New York is now in the middle of a quite bold
experiment, in which the alternative high school diploma,
known as the local diploma, is being phased out. Current
plans are for the Regents exams to become a requirement
for high school graduation for all students in the state by
2003 (New York Times 1996).
Bishop (1996, 1997) has also analyzed the perfor-
mance of Canadian students on the 1991 International
Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP). Canada’s edu-
cational system is in many ways similar to that of the
United States, but significantly, many of Canada’s ten
provinces now require students to pass a provincewide
exam before graduating from high school. Bishop finds
that students from the provinces that have implemented
graduation exams tend to perform significantly better on
the IAEP. A clear concern in all empirical research that uses
differences in policies across political borders is that varia-
tions in the given policy might be endogenous. That prob-
lem appears especially likely in this context: for political
reasons, a ministry of education is less likely to institute
provincewide testing if it knows that its students are likely
to fare poorly. Since research consistently finds that the
socioeconomic background of parents is highly predictive
of students’ achievement, it could be that only richer prov-
inces would institute testing in the first place. However,
the provinces that have instituted testing include not
only the most economically developed, but also the least
economically developed: Newfoundland. This suggests
that the reported correlation between the existence of grad-
uation exams and student test scores reflects true causation.
Bishop (1996) also reports corroborating facts. For instance,
he finds that in provinces that have instituted graduation
exams, students report watching less television. 
In the United States, how widespread is the idea of
graduation exams across states? New York has offered the
Regents examinations to high school students for over a
century. But until 2003, these exams will be partly volun-
tary; students can instead opt for the local diplomas that do
not require the test. In many other states, work is under
way to develop curriculum standards, and in a subset of
these states plans are also under way to require high school
seniors to write graduation exams that are linked to the
curriculum. 
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has
recently committed to performing an annual evaluation of
states’ progress in developing precisely worded curriculum
standards and tests. Their 1996 report suggests a crazy
quilt of reforms across the states. The AFT finds that all
states apart from Rhode Island and Wyoming are now
developing grade-by-grade content standards. Unfortu-
nately, there is an extraordinary disparity in the level of
detail provided in each of the state curricula. The AFT
reports that only Virginia has developed curriculum
standards in English, math, science, and social studies that
are sufficiently clear and explicit to provide guidance to
teachers and parents about what should be taught in each
grade. Of the forty-eight states that are writing or haveFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 105
written curriculum standards in at least one of these sub-
jects, forty-two have developed or are developing tests that
will be based on the content of the curriculum. However,
only fifteen of these forty-two states have planned or are
planning test programs in all four subject areas mentioned
above, with tests being based on precisely worded content
standards. In summary, most states are now developing
content standards in at least a few of the key subject areas
and are developing statewide tests of these curricula. But
only a minority has as yet developed a comprehensive set of
content standards backed by testing. 
ACHIEVEMENT TESTS, REMEDIATION, 
AND GRADE RETENTION POLICIES
Earlier, I argued that a specifically worded curriculum
backed by periodic testing of students could by itself sig-
nificantly improve school quality, because it provides an
objective report card on individual student achievement.
When a student falls behind grade level, the student, his or
her parents, and the school’s teachers can react. But it
seems reasonable that content standards and testing will be
more effective if school systems have a formal plan in place
to deal with students falling behind grade level. Another
critical question is whether the student has anything at
stake. Will a student who is far behind grade level have to
attend after-school tutorials, summer school, or—in
extreme cases—even repeat the same grade next year?
Alternatively, do students not take the tests seriously,
because there are no consequences attached to poor perfor-
mance on them? And if the school system does mandate
remediation, has it put in place a funding mechanism?
The AFT (1996) report provides partial answers to
these questions. Its survey reveals that eighteen of the fifty-
one states (the District of Columbia is treated as a state)
have state-mandated remediation for students who do not
meet the state’s educational standards. However, only ten
of these eighteen states also provide funding to schools for
the additional teaching. 
What are the state-mandated consequences for
students who fail to do well on the achievement tests? The
AFT study finds that even though forty-two states have
planned or are planning statewide tests, only a handful
have made promotion between grades or graduation from
high school conditional upon test scores. The more com-
mon action, adopted or about to be adopted by thirteen
states, has been to institute graduation exams that test
whether a grade 12 student achieves at a level equivalent to
grade 10 standards or higher. This is a noteworthy trend. 
However, it is surprising how few states have
made student promotion decisions based in any way on stu-
dents’ results on the state tests. The only states or districts to
have done so by 1996 were the District of Columbia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.
Why have only three of the forty-two states with
tests and curriculum standards linked test performance to
grade promotion? One explanation is that the empirical
literature on the consequences of grade retention has in
general found that holding a student back one year has
either zero effect or a negative effect on the student’s subse-
quent rate of learning. For instance, in a review of the liter-
ature, Holmes (1989) concludes that most studies have
found that grade retention is associated with poorer perfor-
mance after the student is held back a year. Only nine of
sixty-three studies found that retention improved student
performance. Holmes indicates that in most of these positive
studies the “treatment” of students was not simply reten-
tion but retention accompanied by quite intensive remedia-
tion. It is therefore not clear whether students who were
held back a year did better than the comparison group
because of the additional year or the extra help they received.
The above summary of state policies on curricu-
lum standards and testing suggests that most states are
now working toward these goals, but that in most cases
much remains to be done. It also highlights the substantial
diversity across states in their policies concerning educa-
tional standards. 
The state-level summary ignores the fact that in
most states individual school districts enjoy considerable
autonomy to create their own programs to supplement or
strengthen statewide initiatives. For this reason, the above
summary is likely to understate the extent to which
students in public schools are held to curriculum-based
standards. Similarly, the summary is also likely to under-
state the disparities across schools in the stringency of106 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
academic standards. Interschool and interdistrict variations
in curriculum content and in standards are of particular
concern given that each year so many children switch
schools when their parents move. For this reason, it would
seem worthwhile for a state to set high standards in order to
level out any existing variations in standards across districts.
A detailed analysis of how individual school dis-
tricts within even one state set and enforce standards would
be a major undertaking. But certain school districts around
the country have received national attention for their inno-
vations in setting academic standards. The next section
discusses a particularly bold set of reforms that the Chicago
public schools have recently implemented.
THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS EXPERIMENT
The Chicago public schools (CPS) system is one of the larg-
est school districts in the country. Its students represent an
ethnically and racially diverse group that must contend
with all the challenges of life in a modern urban area. It is
perhaps not surprising, then, that in Chicago students’ aca-
demic performance has long lagged behind national aver-
ages. For example, throughout the 1990s grade 9 students’
average performance on the Tests of Achievement and Profi-
ciency (TAP) has hovered between the twenty-third and
thirty-sixth percentiles of national norms. Results for other
grades have fallen into a similar range.4
The CPS has given tests to children in various
grades throughout the 1980s and 1990s. But during the
1996-97 school year, school administrators made the tests
“matter.” In grades 3, 6, 8, and 9, students whose perfor-
mance lagged behind national norms on either the reading
or mathematics portion of the tests were required to attend
summer school. The cutoff points below which students
were required to attend summer school were 2.8 for grade 3,
5.2 for grade 6, 6.8 for grade 8, and 7.9 for grade 9. (The
tests were given in the spring, so that a student progressing
at the normal rate would be at grade level at the time of the
test, while a score of 2.8 in grade 3 would suggest that the
student was approximately two months behind national
norms.) The summer school, known as the Summer Bridge
Program, lasted for six to seven weeks. At the end of the
Summer Bridge Program, students took the tests a second
time—the TAP in grades 8 and 9 or the Iowa Tests of Basic
Skills in lower grades. A student who met the cutoff grade
equivalents listed above for both reading and math by the
end of summer was allowed to advance to the next grade.5
Students who did not reach the cutoff level in either test
were required to repeat the grade.6 During the 1997-98
school year, students who were held back were in many
cases to receive additional help, typically in the form of
tutorial classes. 
Results from the 1996-97 school year are quite
remarkable, both for the sheer number of students who
failed the initial tests in spring, and for the sizable gains
in achievement recorded for those who entered the Summer
Bridge Program. Table 1 reports the number of students
who failed to reach the cutoff in either math or reading in
Table 1
RESULTS FROM THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ TESTING
AND SUMMER BRIDGE PROGRAMS
Variable Grade 3 Grade 6 Grade 8 Grade 9
SPRING TEST RESULTS
Students taking math test 23,989 25,275 22,708 22,986
Students taking reading test 24,124 25,311 22,776 22,967
Students taking at least one test 24,124 25,311 22,776 22,986
Students failing at least one spring test
   As a percentage of students taking at
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Students taking summer test
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Students passing summer test
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  As a percentage of students who













Percentage of all students taking spring
  tests who passed by end of summer 69.3 79.4 85.6 53.9
GAINS IN PERFORMANCE AMONG SUMMER STUDENTS 
MEAN GRADE EQUIVALENT (GE) OF STUDENTS
Spring GE of students below promotion
  level on spring reading test 2.03 4.41 5.88 6.32
August GE of students below promotion
  level on spring reading test 2.47 5.11 6.87 7.79
Gain in reading GE over summer
Spring GE of students below promotion









August GE of students below promotion
  level on spring math test 2.98 5.20 7.04 8.03
Gain in math GE over summer 0.69 0.62 0.79 1.34FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 107
the spring tests, both as a raw number and as a proportion
of all CPS students who took the spring tests at that
grade level.7 It shows that 27.1 to 62.2 percent of stu-
dents failed at least one of the two tests, depending on the
grade level. 
The table also reports outcomes of the Summer
Bridge Program. There are two complications that must be
dealt with. First, I exclude from the analysis students who
had met the cutoff scores in the spring test but who
enrolled in the Summer Bridge Program on the advice of
the school because they were near the margin. Such stu-
dents automatically “pass” the test in August. The second
complication derives from the fact that only a fraction of
the students who should have enrolled in the Summer
Bridge Program took the tests at the end of summer. For
this reason, I calculate pass rates at the end of summer
using in the denominator both the total number of stu-
dents who took the summer test and the total number who
should have taken the summer test. Using the latter num-
ber, I find that 25.9 to 46.8 percent of students who should
have taken the summer test passed. Note that a substantial
fraction of students in grade 9 did not take the summer
test. The most likely explanation for this is that by CPS
policy, students who were fifteen by December 1, 1997,
were not to be held back in grade 9. When the pass rates
are calculated as a percentage of those who actually took
the summer tests, the success rate is much higher, ranging
from 38.4 to 49.6 percent, with the highest success rate
observed among grade 8 students. But overall, well over
half of the regular students in these grades are promoted at
the end of the school year. The highest success rate is
85.6 percent, among grade 8 students.
Clearly, the Summer Bridge Program is not a pan-
acea for students who initially obtain low scores: over half
of those enrolling in the program do not pass in their
second attempt. But on average, students progressed
remarkably during the program. Table 1 also shows the
initial mean grade equivalent of those who failed to meet
the promotion criterion in the given subject, and the mean
grade equivalent that these same students obtained after
the Summer Bridge Program. The mean gain in grade
equivalents is typically one half year to a full year or even
more. Given the low base from which these students began
in the spring, they remain on average one-half grade to one
grade equivalent behind by August, or in the cases of read-
ing scores in grades 8 and 9, slightly more than one grade
equivalent behind. The observed improvements, however,
are extremely impressive. 
Of course, one concern raised by these data is that
we are observing “regression to the mean.” If a student has
a bad day when taking the spring test and scores consider-
ably below his or her potential, that student might have to
enroll in the Summer Bridge Program. In such a situation,
the student might score much higher on the second test in
August, not because of the usefulness of the program but
because the low test score in the spring was a statistical
aberration. It would be useful to study patterns in the test
scores of students prior to the year they are required to
attend summer school, to determine whether some of the
summer school students were forced to attend simply
because of a bad day in the spring test. Similarly, it would
be useful to follow these students for at least one more year
to check whether the remarkable gains in achievement over
the summer endure. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that nearly half of
Chicago’s summer school students had by the end of the
summer improved sufficiently to meet the promotion crite-
rion. Improvement on this scale suggests that the Chicago
public schools system has found an ideal incentive system for
students. The impressive gains in mean grade equivalent, of
anywhere from 0.6 to 1.3 years in the space of the six- to
seven-week Summer Bridge Program, point in the same
direction. Low academic achievement now has tangible con-
sequences for students: the students must spend extra time
in remedial classes, both in the summer and during the
school year. The CPS has enforced reasonably high standards
and gotten the incentives right at the same time that it has
directed additional funding toward students whose achieve-
ment has lagged the most. Over time, this fledgling pro-
gram could do much to improve the academic achievement
of students who are most in need.
The CPS program also improves on the traditional
“fix” for education, in which wholesale increases are made
in school spending. By identifying students most in need108 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
Chart 4
















Source:  Author’s calculations, based on data from the Longitudinal Study 
of American Youth.
through tests each spring, scarce financial resources are
being targeted toward students who truly need additional
time with teachers. 
It is possible to compare at least roughly the
costs and benefits of regular schooling with those of the
summer school program. A typical American school
spends about $5,000 per pupil per year, and the typical
student in that school will gain one grade equivalent over
the school year. In 1997, the CPS spent about $34 mil-
lion on its Summer Bridge Program, or about $720 per
participant. This sum translates into about $1,000 for
each student who took the test in August, since some
marginal students who participated in the Summer
Bridge Program voluntarily did not take the test at the
end of summer. This latter figure represents about one-
fifth the cost of a year of regular schooling for each student
who participated. Yet the gain in achievement far surpasses
one-fifth of a grade equivalent. As shown in Table 1, the
mean gain over the six- to seven-week summer program
ranged from a low of 0.44 of a grade equivalent in grade 3
reading tests to 1.47 grade equivalents in grade 9 reading
tests. Even assuming that these students gained a full
grade equivalent during the regular academic year, on a
dollar-for-dollar basis the Summer Bridge Program is
anywhere from 2.2 times to 7.4 times as effective as
schooling during the regular year. By any standard, these
additional expenditures appear to have been much more
effective than traditional expenditures made during the
academic year. Over time, it will become possible to test
whether these gains are permanent or transitory.
Some readers will rightly wonder whether the
initial failure of a number of students to meet the pro-
motion criteria simply reflects adverse conditions in the
Chicago public schools relative to those in public
schools elsewhere. Consider the following simulation.
Suppose that national standards were put in place dic-
tating that any secondary school student more than a
year behind in mathematics achievement was required
to attend summer school. Suppose that the criterion for
being “more than a year behind” was that a student in
one grade had a test score below the median test score of
students in the previous grade. What would happen?
Chart 4 depicts the median math test score in a repre-
sentative sample of American high school students by
grade level, which I calculated from the Longitudinal
Study of American Youth (LSAY). (This study followed
approximately 6,000 students over a five-year period.)
The chart also shows the test scores of students at the
twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles, and the mini-
mum and maximum scores observed in each grade. The
most striking aspect of the chart is the huge disparity in
achievement among students within any grade level. In
the sample, the increase in the median math test score
between grades is approximately 2.8 points out of 100.
This median gain is tiny compared with the dispersion
within any grade: the gap between the test scores of stu-
dents in the twenty-fifth percentile and the scores of
students in the seventy-fifth percentile within a grade is
typically about 16 points.
The slow growth in student performance across
grades relative to the large degree of dispersion within
grades in this nationally representative data set suggests
that Chicago’s experience is not atypical. The LSAY data
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behind national norms in schools across the country.
Table 2 shows the percentage of students in the LSAY
who would have to repeat a grade if the criterion for pro-
motion was that a student in grade “N” needed a test
score equal to or above the median score among students
in grade “N-1.” The percentages of students who would
be required to repeat each grade are extremely high, and
quite similar to what has been reported in Chicago, where
the promotion criterion is that students must score,
roughly speaking, within a year of the national norm for
their grade level. The table also shows the percentage of
students who would have to attend summer school under
lower standards. Even when the promotion criterion is
reduced so that a student needs only to obtain the median
test score of students two grades back, anywhere from
26 percent of students in grade 10 to 40 percent of students
in grade 12 would miss the cutoff point.
This simulation illustrates the extent of the prob-
lem in American public schools: disparity in achievement
within grades is simply huge. It also shows that when
school districts set reasonably high standards, they should
be prepared for a large proportion of their students to fall
below the standard, at least initially.
GRADING STANDARDS
A little-examined characteristic of schools is the strin-
gency with which they grade students. If a school makes
it easier to obtain a letter grade of A or B, students might
respond by exerting less effort. Such a response will occur
if students care directly about letter grades, as opposed to
their true level of academic achievement. There are several
plausible reasons for this. First, students may care about
letter grades simply because their parents care. Second,
students may realize that employers may use letter grades
as a signal of a student’s achievement, willingness to work
hard, and so on. Some employers may examine high
school transcripts directly, but it seems likely that an
indirect mechanism is at least as important: firms rely on
the postsecondary sector to identify high school students
who have done well. College admission offices in effect
act as an information intermediary between students and
employers by closely examining high school transcripts in
an effort to identify the students most likely to gain from
further education.
In Betts (1997), I examine grading policies in
math and science courses in a representative sample of
American schools. By comparing students’ test scores in
these subjects with their letter grades, I construct measures
of the grading standards at each school. I find that American
high schools differ radically in the way in which they
assign letter grades to students of given achievement. I also
find that the stringency with which a school grades is
strongly related to the rate at which students learn. Even
after controlling for the initial level of achievement of stu-
dents at the school, traits of the individual student, traits
of his or her family and peers, and detailed traits of the
classroom, I observe that the school’s grading standard
remains a highly significant and positive predictor of gains
in test scores. Unfortunately, a policy of higher standards
does not improve the performance of all students identi-
cally. Although C students benefit from attending a more
rigorous school, A students benefit even more. The lesson
is clear: in this instance, a policy of higher standards will
also induce higher disparities in achievement. If a school
administration is concerned with the distribution of
student achievement, and not just the mean level of
achievement, remedial policies to assist students with
lower grade-point averages are in order.
HOMEWORK
Each of the above suggestions for improving schools
involves setting higher standards. A closely related
suggestion is to increase the amount of homework that
Table 2
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS WHOSE MATH SCORES
WOULD MISS CUTOFFS BASED ON MEDIAN SCORES
IN PRIOR GRADES
Grade
Percentage below Median Score
in Previous Grade
Percentage below Median Score
Two Grades Earlier





Source:  Author’s calculations, based on math test score data for students
participating in the Longitudinal Study of American Youth.110 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
teachers assign. This is perhaps better thought of as a way
of setting higher academic expectations than as a way of
setting higher academic standards, although of course
teachers can hold students accountable if they routinely
fail to complete their homework. A policy of assigning
more homework is quite similar in spirit to the earlier
suggestions, because it too recognizes that one of the
most important inputs in the “education production
function” is the student’s own effort. This simple fact has
been ignored in most of the traditional studies of whether
“spending matters.”
A number of studies of the impact of homework
on achievement have been carried out. Cooper (1989) gives
a good review of the existing evidence. Two experimental
studies have been performed, with somewhat mixed
results. In both cases, the number of students involved in
the experiment was very small, ranging from roughly 90 to
350 students. Cooper also reports that a number of correla-
tional studies find a positive and significant link between
the time students spend on homework and their achieve-
ment. The effectiveness of homework appears to be higher
in secondary schools than in the elementary grades. Unfor-
tunately, virtually all of the correlational studies test for a
relationship between the amount of homework that stu-
dents report doing and their achievement. This approach
leads to a clear possibility of reverse causation: if better
students routinely choose to do more homework than their
peers, then the observed relationship between test scores
and homework might be spurious. 
A partial solution to this problem is to model
student achievement not as a function of the homework
that students do but as a function of the homework that
teachers assign. In Betts (1996b), I use the aforemen-
tioned LSAY data for this purpose. I find a strong positive
link between the amount of homework that teachers
assign and the rate at which the student’s test score rises.
I also estimate a “fixed-effect” model in which I use varia-
tions in the amount of homework assigned to individual
students across grades to identify the effectiveness of
homework, with similar results. The estimated effects of
additional homework are quite striking. Using published
estimates of the relationship between math test scores and
earnings, I calculate that an hour spent doing homework
is equivalent to earning about $6 to $12. I make these
estimates by discounting the future wage gains at a rate
of 3 percent and by setting the opportunity cost of doing
homework at the average earnings per hour of teenagers.
Additional homework appears to be a particularly cost-
effective method of improving school quality: it is the
total amount of homework assigned—rather than the
amount assigned, graded, and returned—that is more
closely related to students’ rate of learning. The effective-
ness of homework, by any measure, is quite large. The
results suggest that among the students in grades 7
through 12 in the sample, a one-hour homework assign-
ment is as effective as an hour spent in class.
HIGHER STANDARDS ARE NOT ONLY FOR 
STUDENTS: PROVIDING INCENTIVES TO 
TEACHERS AND SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
To this point, I have focused on the methods of improving
incentives for students that target additional spending
toward the students most in need. However, the same prin-
ciple of tying additional spending to the setting of higher
standards can be applied to teachers and entire school
systems just as easily as it can be applied to students. Space
constraints prevent me from developing this theme in
detail, but the following discussion highlights the main
arguments.
The essential point is that there are good teachers
and bad teachers, effective principals and less effective
principals. What, then, should a school board do when,
after setting higher standards for its students, it realizes
that at some schools the only remedy for low achievement
is to improve the quality of teaching?
Improving teacher quality requires a two-pronged
approach—setting up the economic incentives required to
attract well-trained college graduates to the teaching pro-
fession while providing opportunities for more experienced
teachers to gain new skills. Typically, school districts set
teachers’ salaries as a fairly rigid function of teachers’ years
of experience and the degrees they hold. To obtain a perma-
nent certification, teachers in many states must obtain a
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typically lead to a Master’s degree. Yet the evidence that
teachers who hold a Master’s degree are better teachers is
decidedly mixed (see, for instance, Betts [1995a], Grogger
[1996], and Betts [1996a]). Paying teachers by the level of
degree held may make less sense than paying teachers extra
for any college courses that pertain to their field of teach-
ing in the school. A number of authors—for instance,
Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) and Betts (1995b)—have
found that college training in the field taught is related to
teaching ability. Similarly, mechanically linking teachers’
pay to years taught may not be the optimal policy: evi-
dence suggests that teachers, especially after the first few
years of teaching, do not necessarily continue to improve
their quality of teaching much over time. Similarly, it is
important for school administrators to respond to market
forces. Murnane et al. (1991) show that over the last
twenty years the starting salary for teachers has consis-
tently lagged behind that of college graduates who work in
industry. They argue strongly in favor of merit pay for
teachers as a method of ensuring that the best teachers
remain in the profession.8
The question immediately arises, how can princi-
pals identify the best teachers in order to allocate merit
pay? The need for ongoing and objective assessment of
teachers provides yet another reason why it is so important
for school districts to set out a clear curriculum and then to
assess students. But it would be wrong to reward teachers
solely on the basis of the mean test scores in their classes.
Given evidence that family background and peer effects
strongly influence student achievement, such a policy
would in effect punish teachers who taught in disadvan-
taged neighborhoods. Within schools, it would aggravate
any tendency that might already exist for teachers to prefer
to teach the most advanced students within each grade. A
more reasonable approach might be to establish merit pay
as a function of how much student achievement improves
over one or two years. 
Similar policies of merit pay for principals might
also work. A number of school districts around the country
have gone further, setting the pay of superintendents of
entire districts to reflect the rate of improvement of the
district’s students.
Merit pay, additional course work for experi-
enced teachers, and a less rigid structure for teacher salaries
that would allow schools to attract talented college
graduates in fields such as math and science are all good
ideas. In some cases, however, more radical solutions
might be needed. Perhaps in recognition of this, a number
of state legislatures over the last few years have attempted
to remove teacher tenure, so that school districts would
find it easier to fire teachers who were not performing
adequately. To the best of my knowledge, none of these
reforms has met with success, because of opposition
from a number of sources, including—not surprisingly—
teachers’ unions. Individual school districts have also
started to put on “probation” those schools whose stu-
dents fare poorly, and in some cases have “reconstituted”
entire schools by firing or reassigning virtually all
employees, from the principal down to the custodial
staff, in a bid to change the prevailing culture at the
school. It is too early to know whether such radical
restructuring has had the intended results. 
A different method for improving schools is to
increase the degree of competition between schools. Basic
economic models argue that when a firm has a monopoly, it
will restrict supply and charge higher prices than it would
if there were a high degree of competition in the market.
By analogy, when a school district is the sole provider of
schooling, the lack of competition allows it to do less with
each education dollar than it would under competition.
Ballou (1996) provides a recent and interesting example of
how a lack of competition may render public schools ineffi-
cient. He finds that when hiring teachers, public schools
do not seem to give any preference to applicants who have
superior academic records. This finding is puzzling, given
evidence by Ehrenberg, Goldhaber, and Brewer (1995)
that cognitive abilities of teachers are positively and sig-
nificantly related to the rate at which their students learn.
Ballou’s conclusion is that public schools face little com-
petition for students, and so do not invest sufficient effort
in finding the best applicants for teaching jobs. This con-
clusion, if true, would be an example of an inefficiency that
would surely disappear if schools competed with each other
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A companion paper in this volume by Hoxby
(1998) describes in detail the evidence that competition—
whether between school districts or between public and
private schools—might improve the efficiency of public
schools. In addition, the paper by Rouse (1998) in this
volume addresses the effectiveness of vouchers.
While the argument in favor of increased school
choice appears to have some empirical backing, it is crucial to
understand that such choice can work only if parents make
informed decisions. Informed decisions require good informa-
tion about schools. This provides yet another rationale for
regular testing of students. Without a districtwide—or, pref-
erably, city- or statewide—report card on student achievement
and gains in student achievement at each school, it is unlikely
that parents will be able to make informed decisions about the
schools that are best for their children.9
OBSTACLES TO HIGHER STANDARDS 
AND SOME SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
If academic standards—in the form of a clearly worded
curriculum and tests designed around the curriculum—are
such good ideas, then why do we not see more widespread
use of these tools? Critics have raised many specific objec-
tions, but it is crucial to realize at the outset that testing
threatens many interests. What politician wants to have it
publicized that schools within his or her district are not
adequately serving students? Testing can also cause dis-
comfort for teachers, students, and in some cases parents.
Because assessment, done properly, provides an objective
“report card” on schools, it often provides impetus for
radical change. Many professionals in education will natu-
rally resist change. 
Existing theoretical work on educational standards
points to a second reason for opposition to higher stan-
dards. Two models developed by Costrell (1994) and Betts
(1998) differ in some regards, but both establish that
whenever a school raises its standards (such as a pass-fail
standard), some students will lose out. In essence, a student
whose ability or diligence was such that he or she was
initially indifferent to meeting the standard or falling
below it will choose not to exert the extra effort required
after the standard is raised. This can lead to a significant
drop in well-being for such students. This theoretical
result suggests that in the real world, school administrators
who raise standards will have to devote additional atten-
tion to “borderline” students to ensure that they are able to
continue meeting the requirements for grade promotion or
for high school graduation. 
A commonly heard complaint about testing of
curriculum standards is that it will lead to teachers wasting
time “teaching to the test.” Why should teachers be forced
to squander valuable class time helping children to memo-
rize facts and tricks for a multiple-choice test when they
should be steering children toward more profound forms of
learning, or so the argument goes. There is no doubt an
element of truth in this statement. But, ideally, a test
should not only require regurgitation of memorized facts,
but should also assess a student’s ability to synthesize, to
apply concepts learned in one context in a new environ-
ment, and so on. Ideally, then, tests will include not only
multiple-choice questions but also questions requiring a
written response. In short, if administrators write a test
properly, teaching to the test is exactly what teachers
should be doing.
Recent experience indicates that the main barriers
to higher educational standards backed by testing are
political. President Clinton’s call for voluntary national
tests in reading in grade 4 and in math in grade 8 has
recently met strong opposition on Capitol Hill.10 Some
legislators have objected that federally backed tests represent
an intrusion by Washington into education, which tradi-
tionally has been controlled at the state level. President
Clinton has responded, with some justification, that the
basic elements of mathematics are the same regardless of
the state in which the student in question lives. Why
should children—and schools—in some states be held to
standards lower than those in other states?
One can also make a case for national standards on
cost grounds. Surely, a reasonable set of national standards
could be drafted at far lower expense than could fifty sets of
standards, each specific to a given state. The problem is
compounded by the actions of the many school districts
that have drafted their own content standards in recent
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effort, but it can create problems for students who move
between school districts within a state at some time.
Clearly, however, when representatives from fifty
states meet to attempt to establish national standards,
diverse opinions are likely to lead to diluted national stan-
dards. Fear of such an outcome may explain why so many
states have taken it upon themselves to develop curriculum
standards, and why many school districts have developed
their own content standards to supplement those provided
by the state. It would appear that proponents of national
standards will have the greatest chance of success if they
focus on subjects in which there is general agreement about
required elements of a core curriculum. For instance, the rel-
ative success of the National Council of Teachers of Mathe-
matics in its attempt to create national standards in math
stands in strong contrast to the recent failure of an attempt
to create national standards in the much more contentious
subject area of history. The divergence in outcomes may
reflect underlying disagreements about what is important in
an area. Therefore, it might be advisable, at least at first, for
educators seeking national or even state-level standards to
focus on areas such as mathematics, reading, and writing. 
Space constraints prevent a further discussion of
barriers to higher standards. However, readers interested in
these issues should see Ravitch (1995) for a compelling
insider’s account of the history of educational standards in
the United States. In particular, Chapters 5 and 6 of her
book develop a clear prescription for change that is appeal-
ing in an economic sense, yet takes heed of the political
realities of school reform today. 
CONCLUSION: A CHECKLIST FOR REFORM
In the 1990s, virtually all states have started to develop
curriculum standards to increase student achievement.
Although the states vary remarkably in the number of
subject areas for which they are developing curriculum
standards—and in the specific content of the standards—as
a group they have clearly made significant progress. 
A necessary companion policy to higher standards
is increased spending on assessment of student achieve-
ment. Testing is crucial. To ensure that reforms are effec-
tive, administrators must do more than prescribe a
minimal curriculum in key subjects; they must evaluate
the extent to which individual students meet the stan-
dards. Such tests serve a dual purpose: not only do they cre-
ate an incentive for students to exert effort, they also
provide a means to make teachers, schools, and entire
school systems accountable to the public. The regular pub-
lication of test results by school is also an indispensable
tool if public schools introduce a system in which parents
can choose the school their children attend.
In this paper, I have reviewed recent attempts by
states and school boards to raise standards. Limited empiri-
cal evidence suggests that higher expectations—whether
established through higher graduation standards, more
stringent homework requirements, higher grading stan-
dards, or increased requirements for promotion between
grades—can spur student achievement. The paper also
reviews the serious roadblocks that have hindered attempts
to tighten standards, and suggests some ways in which
school administrators can address the concerns of critics of
testing and standards.
The two most historically important reforms to
public schools in this century—raising the school-leaving
age and increasing spending per pupil—in a sense form a
two-legged stool. Allowing students to leave school at a
certain age without having them demonstrate a minimal
level of achievement is a shortsighted policy. Achieve-
ment, not age alone, should determine when a person is
ready to leave school. Similarly, large increases in school
spending that are not accompanied by increases in the
standards to be met by students and their schools are
likely to achieve little. Only by coupling these two policies
to higher standards—and by testing the ability of students
to meet the standards—are we likely to see large
improvements in school quality. For this reason, the
reforms in educational standards currently under way in
many states have the potential to be surprisingly more
effective than previous reforms.114 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 NOTES
ENDNOTES
The author thanks Sandra Storey and Joseph Hahn for helpful discussions
concerning the Chicago data.
1. Male workers are chosen, since the studies reviewed in Betts (1996a)
examine earnings of men only.
2. In 1990-91, total spending per pupil in American public schools was
$5,320, while the current expenditure was $4,847 per pupil (National
Center for Education Statistics 1991, p. 155).
3. The one exception is for estimates of the return to increasing the
teacher-pupil ratio derived from school-level studies. Betts (1996a) finds
that the average effect of this intervention is actually slightly negative, so
that increasing the discount rate lowers the predicted losses.
4. All information in this section that relates to the Chicago public
schools was obtained directly from the CPS system, except where noted.
5. A student who passed one test in the spring and the other test at the
end of summer school was promoted. In addition, a small number of
students who met the grade equivalent criterion for both reading and
mathematics in the spring, but whose scores were borderline, voluntarily
enrolled in the Summer Bridge Program.
6. The consequences for grade 9 students whose test scores were too low
were slightly different. Any such student who was at least fifteen years
old by December 1, 1997, was not retained, but was sent to a special
remedial school, known as a High School Transition Center.
7. Students enrolled in the bilingual education program are exempted
from participation in the Summer Bridge Program for up to three years.
Similarly, special education students are not required to meet the
standards. Accordingly, all calculations in Table 1 exclude these two
types of students.
8. See, however, Chapter 5 of Ballou and Podgursky (1997), which
argues that attempts to strengthen the incentive structure faced by
teachers are unlikely to have much success, given the likelihood of
opposition from entrenched interests.
9. See Hanushek et al. (1994, Chap. 6) for a detailed summary of ideas
on how administrators could use incentives to improve schools. 
10. See, for instance, Applebome (1997).REFERENCES
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